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ACCELERATING ADVISORY OPINIONS:
CRITIQUE AND PROPOSAL
By Michael Reisman *
Festina lente
Time is a fundamental component of all social organization. Any com-
ponent may be manipulated to achieve preferred outcomes, but time is
particularly malleable. The concept of linear time, which allows complex
sequential and conditional planning and deferred allocation of resources,
is a critical part of Western political theory, for it facilitates the extension
of present control far into the future., A peculiar genius of the law has
been the elaboration of this linearism and the manipulation and supervision
of different phases of future activity. Manipulation of time in mundane
legal activities has a utility per se in that it permits order and efficiency in
the complex, adversarial, but necessarily collaborative operations of groups
and individuals.2 It is also a prerequisite to the realization of many other
procedural privileges; without "enough" time, the privileges may be mean-
ingless and even taunting.
• Of the Board of Editors. This article is a chapter of a work in progress, entitled
"Six Studies in Procedural Pathology: A Critique of the Work of the International Court
of Justice." It has benefitted from discussions with Myres McDougal. In addition,
Philip Jessup and Leo Gross made many searching criticisms and a number of sugges-
tions, some of which have been incorporated. The Table in the Annex was designed
by James Malysiak, Yale J.D. 1973.
1 See generally L. Mtmiroan, TEGmcs AND CwvmLZATON 16, 42, 272 (1934, 1963).
2The Kantian notion that time, though not a thing in itself, is an immutable part of
the mind is increasingly rejected. The more relativist position, as developed, for ex-
ample, by von BertalanIfy, is that time schema are a product of varying biological and
cultural factors: von Bertalanffy, An Essay on the Relativity of Categories, 243, 22
PmLr. oF SciNcE 243 (1945); reprinted in GmqrmAL Sys'mxs 71 (1962). See also
SI-FBE, BmyoND Thms (1964) for reports of dramatic experiments in this regard. For
a psychoanalytical critique, see BROWN, LarE AcAiNsT DEA 272-75 (1959, paperback
ed. 1970).
The most refined and articulated use of the time artifact in law is found in the
common law's development of future interests, on which there is an enormous literature.
Social scientists have been much concerned with "total control" situations in which an
effective elite may organize social time in order to contribute to securing whatever the
elite determines to be major institutional goals. Hence time-budget studies and time
and motion studies for industrial settings, timetables for hospitals and prisons and so on.
See J. Rora, Tn=nABLEs: Smu'ImumN Tan- PASSAGE or Trm in HosPrrAL TnEAT-
wmEN AN OTBER CaPmnas (1963). For discussion and literature on time as a perva-
sive component of social organization, see J. Goody, Time: Social Organization, 16
I.E.S.S. 31-41 (1968). For a survey of theories of time as factors in social change,
see M. Heirich, The Use of Time in the Study of Social Change, Asn. SOCIOLoxciAL R.
386 (1954).
The manipulation of time may also have per se costs in terms of biological and
psychological integrity. For some discussion, see the interesting speculative article by
Wiegele, Toward a Psychophysiological Variable in Conflict Theory, 1 ExPmnmAL
STnUy oF PoLrrcs 51 (1971).
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A subtle aspect of adjudicative procedure is the design and implementa-
tion of the temporal sequences in which litigation takes place. I will refer
generally to this manipulation of time as "temporal procedures." Temporal
procedures have rationales. They are designed and refined by practice to
maximize the efficiency of decisions and the skill of litigants and court in
standardized contexts. Variations from these procedures can be evaluated
in terms of their costs and their gains.
I
TBE INTErNATIONAL CouRT's Tnm DESIGN
With comparatively few meaningful guidelines from the Statute and the
Rules of Court,3 the International Court of Justice plays a major role in
designing the time sequences of different phases of adjudication. Its con-
temporary role can thus be compared with that of common law courts
before the codification of rules of procedure and, in particular, the estab-
lishment of formal time limits for sequences of the judicial process. 4  But
the analogy cannot be pressed too far. For centuries common law courts
have not had to depend upon the consent of the litigants in order to secure
jurisdiction. To a great extent international tribunals must concern them-
3 Statute Article 29 establishes a chamber of five judges "with a view to the speedy
dispatch of business." Article 41, dealing with interim measures, is premised on the
need for speed in certain cases. Article 43 confirms the Court's authority to fix time
limits, and Article 48 confirms its more general procedural authority. Article 52 au-
thorizes the Court to refuse to accept belated evidence, after the time limits it has set
have expired. Article 61 limits the Court's revisory capacity to six months from the
date of a new fact becoming known, but in no case more than ten years from the date
of judgment.
Rules of Court Articles 36 and 37 (revised 1972) require the Registrar to transmit
notice of application "forthvith" and the desire for expedition is found again in Article
38 ("as soon as possible"). Articles 40 and 41 (discussed infra) treat the setting of
time limits. Article 53 authorizes the President of the Court to decide postponement
only if the parties do not agree on the point. Rule Article 52, dealing with belated
adduction of evidence, ;s somewhat narrower than Statute Article 52, for it seems to
self-deny the Court's statutory power to refuse belated adduction even semble if the
parties agree thereto. Article 53 refers to prior notification to the Registry of evidence
a party intends to bring ("in sufficient time before the commencement of the oral
proceedings"). Article 56 asks that oral statements be "as succinct as possible." Pre-
sumably Articles 53 and 56 are hortatory; no sanctions are designated. Article 69
dealing with interventions by third-parties requires that they be taken no later than the
commencement of the oral proceedings. Article 76(4), dealing with Chambers, re-
quires the President to convene it "at the earliest date compatible with requirements of
the procedure," and Article 77 is somewhat more peremptory in regard to the Chamber's
competence to set time limits.
Article 87 of the Rules states that an accelerated procedure will be followed when
the requesting agency indicates or the Court concludes that urgency is called for. For
doctrinal treatment, see L. Gross, The Time Element in the Contentious Proceedings of
the International Court of justice, 63 AJIL 74 (1969); on the more technical problem
of computation, see DeAk, Computation of Time in International Law, 20 AJIL 502
(1926).
' See, for example, Rule 6, Federal Practice Rules (1971).
1974]
HeinOnline -- 68 Am. J. Int'l L. 649 1974
THE AMECAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
selves with this problem. Hence their ambit of discretion, in dealing with
time as in other matters, is constrained by the quantity of effective power
that they believe components of the world community will deploy to sup-
port their decisions. And common law systems do not generally provide
for an advisory jurisdiction.5 In international advisory cases, the ICJ may
assume a public role greater than that of the domestic tribunal in ordinary
litigation of the meum and tuum of municipal life. In this article, our
focus is primarily the advisory jurisdiction of the Court. Where appro-
priate, experience will be drawn from the contentious jurisprudence of the
Court. Some of the recommendations developed will be applicable to both
jurisdictions. Since both contentious and advisory jurisdictions produce
choices that affect the political process, the term "decision" will be used
generically to refer to them; ( the term "litigant" or "parties" will refer to
actors who address the Court.
The manipulation of time in international tribunals may have great im-
pacts on the case at bar and the community. In certain circumstances, the
time element is critical for a major or ancillary issue. Where the subject
of litigation is a res quae usu tolluntur, the speed of the decisionmaldng
process must seek to surpass the speed of the consumption of the object
at issue. Where the issue concerns a seasonal industry, such as fishing,
shortening time may be important as a way to minimize the losses of that
party which may be vindicated in the suit or, at least, to provide it with
an earlier opportunity to shift its resources into other areas to lessen future
loss.7 Speed may also be necessary if a major international institution
must postpone a decision until an advisory opinion is issued. Judge
Jim6nez de Ar6chaga believes that, "a request for an advisory opinion
normally implies a postponement of a decision on the merits by the re-
questing organ until the answer has been received." 8 But postponement
of a decision does not dictate speed of adjudication; indeed, reference to
the Court for an opinion may be a device to buy or to waste time.
A number of procedures are available to litigants who concur in the need
5 The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is, to all intents and purposes, a con-
tentious appeal instance. The prominent common law exception is the Canadian "Ref-
erence" power and its analogues in Canadian provincial legislation. Supreme Court
Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s.55. See generally STRAYM, JuDIciALREVIWv oF LEGISLA-
TioN 3x C"aNAA 189 ff. (1968). Cf. U.S. Constitution, Article 3(1). For one recent
construction, see Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S.Ct. 1361 (1972). On the broader func-
tion of advisory jurisdiction, see HUDsoN, P murA rmN CouRT OF INTrmATIoNAL
Jus-icE 523-24 (1942).
GSee generally R s maw, Nu.ri .ANDR EnvsioN 157-59 (1971). Barberis has noted
in this regard that both the Permanent Court and the International Court have men-
tioned opinions and decisions as precedents indistinguishably. See J. A. Barberis, La
Jurisprudencia Internacional coma fuente de Derecho de Gentes segdin la Corte de la
Haya, 31 ZAbRV 641, 667 (1971).
7 See, for example, Fisheries Jurisdiction, case, [1972] ICJ REP. 35. But Cf. the
Court's refusal to accelerate procedure to take account of the seasonal requirements of
the British fishing industry: Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, Order [1951] ICJ rX,. 9.
8 Jim6nez de Arzchaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of justice, 67 AJIL 1, 9 (1973).
[Vol. 68
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for expediting the process: a chamber of summary procedure,9 the device
of stipulation of either facts or principles of law,1- and even prior agree-
ments on time limits. But it is the Court which is magister temporis, the
major architect in shaping the temporal dimension in each case. Article
48 of the Statute provides:
The Court shall make orders for the conduct of the case, shall decide
the form and time in which each party must conclude its arguments,
and make all arrangements connected with the taking of evidence.
Article 40 of the Rules, as revised,11 illuminates the general power of the
Court to conduct hearings as set out in Statute Article 48. Rule 40
provides:
1. In every case submitted to the Court, the President will ascertain
the views of the parties with regard to questions of procedure; for this
purpose he may summon the agents to meet him as soon as they have
been appointed.
9 See Art. 26 to 29 of the Statute of the Court and Art. 24 to 27 of the Rules of
Court
10 Note, however, that stipulations prearranged by the parties probably do not bind
the International Court of Justice, the preeminent role of the compromis in a system of
consensual jurisdiction notwithstanding. Jura novit curia. Thus, in Coleann c. Etat
Allemand, 9 R.D.T.A.M. 216, the Mixed Tribunal would not hold itself bound by party
preagreement on certain points. In a dissent in the Oscar Chinn case, Judge Schiucking
contended that the terms of Statute Article 38 obliged the Court to ignore treaties
stipulated by the litigants if the Court knew that the treaties were invalid. [19341
PCIJ ser. A/B No. 63, at 149-50. An analogy to stipulated but incorrect facts would
be compelling, although the ICJ might well provide an opinion on preagreed "hypo-
thetical" facts which could be of use to the litigants, for example in establishing ex
nihilo a complex treaty regime. Some precedent for this type of activity might be
found in the Namibia case itself; there the Court advised all states of the lawfulness of
different types of projected behavior which was not yet commenced or consummated
in occupied South West Africa: [1971] ICJ RP. 16, 54-57. In the Monetary Gold
case, the International Court seems to have rejected the options which the parties to
the Washington Agreement proposed, although the reasons for the Court's choice in this
complex and baffling decision are not clear: [1954] ICJ RPB. 19. On the other hand,
in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case, [19531 ICJ REP. 47, the Court accepted com-
promissary options which, according to one scholar, obliged the Court to assume that
either France or the United Kingdom owned the islets and excluded the possibility of
condominium or res nullius: RocHE, THE MINQUEPRs AND Ecanuos CASE: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE DECISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUsTICE 49 ff. (1959). An im-
portant factor in the lawfulness of these preagreements would seem to be the extent to
which they infringed rights of third parties. Thus in Minquiers and Ecrehos, corn-
promissary preagreement which precluded a decision confirming that the existence of
a condominium would be lawful, for it would affect only the litigants themselves. I
would suggest that the same pattern of reasoning be applied to problems of determining
lawfulness of time stipulations: Does the subject matter of the case and the effect of
acceleration affect only the litigants themselves or does it also affect others, outside of
the judicial arena? For other criteria for such decisions, see infra at pp. 17-23. See
also REIs MNuu, supra note 6, at 541-54.
11 The Rules, as amended on May 10, 1972, are published in ICJ Aars AIn DoCU-
Nirxrs, No. 2, and in 67 AJIL 195 ff. (1973). Background material is found in
Jim~nez de Arkchaga, supra note 8.
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2. In the light of the information obtained by the President, the
Court will make the necessary orders to determine, inter alia, the
number and the order of filing of the pleadings and the time-limits
within which they must be filed.
3. In making an order under paragraph 2 of this Article, any agree-
ment between the parties which does not cause unjustified delay shall
be taken into account.
4. The Court may, at the request of the party concerned, extend any
time-limit, or decide that any step taken after the expiration of the
time-limit fixed therefor shall be considered as valid, if it is satisfied
that there is adequate justification for the request. In either case the
other party shall be given an opportunity to state its views.
5. If the Court is not sitting, its powers under this Article shall be
exercised by the President, but witout prejudice to any subsequent
decision of the Court. If the consultation referred to in paragraph 1
of this Article reveals persistent disagreement between the parties as
to the application of Article 44, paragraph 2, or Article 45, paragraph
2, of these Rules the Court shall be convened to decide the matter.
Article 52 of the Statute gives the Court a limited policing power over
some temporal sequences of procedure.
After the Court has received the proofs and evidence within the time
specified for the purpose, it may refuse to accept any further oral or
written evidence that one party may desire to present unless the other
side consents.
As is characteristic of consensual jurisdiction, the Court cannot, it would
seem, bar belated oral or written evidence if the other litigating party
consents.12 If, however, the other party does not consent, the Court has
discretion whether to permit belated adduction of evidence. The Court
has on occasion acted contrary to the wishes of the parties in regard to
setting and revising time limits. In the Asylum case, a postponement re-
quested by one party and agreed to by the other was refused on the
grounds of "good administration of justice." '3 Later, a request for post-
ponement, opposed by one party, was granted by the Court.14 The Court
has been forceful, if not quite as decisive, in time-limit matters in the
12 However, an arbitral tribunal, it would seem, might under certain circumstances,
bar proprio motu such belated adduction despite the agreement thereto by the other
litigant. If, for example, the tribunal concluded that the time limit of its compromis
could be tolled if it did not close proceedings and undertake judgment, it might bar
belated evidence. It is arguable that, in such circumstances, the opposing party's agree-
ment to adduction of belated evidence is also a tacit extension of the temporal life of
the compromis. However, with the lesson of the disruption of the Franco-Mexican
Commission of 1924, an arbitrator would be prudent to bar belated adduction unless
written agreement to temporal extension were given. 5 U.N.R.I.A.A. 512 (1929) and
see CA:asrox, T. PROEss OF INTmuA-TIONAL A:BrrRAn0N 47 (1946).
Is [1949] ICJ REP. 267.
14 [1950] ICJ REP. 125; in this case, the Court appears to have been moved by its
own administrative exigencies. Among other reasons which the Court cited for its order,
it noted the ". . . priority which the Court must give to other cases . . ." ibid.
[Vol. 68
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Fisheries case 5 and the Right of Passage case.16  Yet in contentious cases,
the Court shares the competence to shape the time dimension with the
litigants. Though the litigants may be responsible for the lethargy of
proceedings, the Court often bears the blame. With some apparent exas-
peration, the International Court in the Barcelona Traction case, noted
the unusual length of the present proceedings, which has been due to
the very long time-limits requested by the parties for the preparation
of their written pleadings and in addition to their repeated requests
for an extension of these limits.17
In separate opinions, Judges Fitzmaurice '8 and Jessup 19 commented even
more acidly on the parties' tempo.
Because advisory procedures are less consensual, formally if not actually,
in their jurisdictional basis,20 the Court's statutory authority to set and to
police stringent time limits would seem even greater. Whereas the con-
currence of "the other side" in contentious procedures forces the Court to
extend a time limit to permit the adduction of belated oral or written
evidence, the absence of an "other side" in advisory procedures would
appear to give the Court a much freer hand in time control. And, indeed,
Article 66 of Chapter IV of the Statute, entitled "Advisory Opinions," de-
tails the increased power of the Court, or, if not in session, the President,
to set time limits.2 '
15 [1950] ICJ REP. 62.
18 [1958] ICJ REP. 40. A number of other cases are discussed in 2 RosmzuE, THE
LAw AND PRACTICE OF T=E INTERiAnTONAL CouRT 559-62 (1965).
17 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited,
[1970] ICJ REp. 4, 30-31.
18 Id. at 113. 19 Id. at 221.
20 Where the effectiveness of an advisory opinion depends upon the acquiescence of
a state or states and the organ or agency requesting the opinion does not have the
effective power to force the actual targets to comply, the Court encounters the same
control considerations it ordinarily faces in contentious jurisdiction: see RmsmAN, supra
note 6, at 277-85. Thus in cases such as Certain Expenses [1962] ICJ REP'. 151 and
Namibia [1971] ICJ REP. 16 the effectiveness of the advisory opinion will depend upon
preponderant superpower acquiescence and, in the latter case, acquiescence of South
Africa. A comparable analysis can be applied in regard to the Peace Treaties case
[1950] ICJ REP. 65; 221.
"'Statute Article 66 provides:
1. The Registrar shall forthwith give notice of the request for an advisory opinion
to all states entitled to appear before the Court.
2. The Registrar shall also, by means of a special and direct communication,
notify any state entitled to appear before the Court or international organization
considered by the Court, or, should it not be sitting, by the President, as likely to
be able to furnish information on the question, that the Court will be prepared to
receive, within a time limit to be fixed by the President, written statements, or to
hear, at a public sitting to be held for the purpose, oral statements relating to the
question.
3. Should any such state entitled to appear before the Court have failed to
receive the special communication referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, such
state may express a desire to submit a written statement or to be heard; and the
Court will decide.
4. States and organizations having presented written or oral statements or both
shall be permitted to comment on the statements made by other states or organiza-
1974]
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The rubric "advisory" may conceal contention. Indeed, substantively
contentious bilateral cases, such as the Nationality Decrees 2 2 case, have
been brought before the Permanent Court under advisory jurisdiction.2
In cases such as these, there is, in the language of Article 52, an "other
side," whose consent to belated adduction might extend time limits without
regard to the wishes of the Court. Where "contention" exists under the
advisory jurisdiction of the Court, Article 68 of the Statute provides:
In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be
guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in con-
tentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be appli-
cable.
When there is an "other side," the Court ought to extend to it the peculiar
procedural prerogatives which contentious adjudication vouchsafes.24 There
are two reasons for this. First, these safeguards are part of the distinctive
character of the judicial arena; compliance with notions of "fairness" is a
component of the authority and ultimately the power of the Court. Second,
without assurance of compliance with these safeguards, states are unlikely
to lend the participation which is critical to the Court's effectiveness. In
advisory as well as contentious cases, the Court must consider more than
its own convenience and its own perspective of an appropriate time se-
quence, when time is, or is provisionally deemed to be, of the essence.
Even in those cases in which time is not of the essence, the Court must
shape the time dimension in appropriate ways. The ICJ, with its present
and projected docket, is unlike institutions such as domestic courts and
tions in the form, to the extent and within the time limits which the Court, or,
should it not be sitting, the President, shall decide in each particular case. Ac-
cordingly, the Registrar shall in due time communicate any such written statements
to states and organizations having submitted similar statements.
22 PCIJ ser. B, No. 4, at 17.
22 The parties may be quite candid about the contentious, bilateral character of the
"advisory opinion." See the speech by Sir Douglas Hogg before the Court, January 9,
1922 PCIJ ser. C, Acts and Documents Relating to Judgments and Advisory Opinions
Given by the Court, No. 2, Documents Relating to Advisory Opinion No. 4, Annex 2,
at 17. Other transparently "contentious" advisory opinions have included Railway
Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, PCIJ ser. A/B, No. 42, at 108; Jaworzina Bound-
ary. PCIJ ser. B, No. 8, at 6.
24The Court's actual response to advisory cases in which the guest of honor chose
not to attend has varied, but has almost always indicated concern for the absence of
consent. In the Status of Eastern Carelia case, the Permanent Court refused to render
an opinion because the Soviet Union, in many senses the defendant, refused to consent
or attend: [1923] PCIJ ser. B, No. 5 at 7, 27-29. In that case, the Soviet Union
was not even a member of the League of Nations and hence could not be deemed to
have undertaken either a general or collateral obligation to adjudicate differences. In
the contentious Monetary Gold case [1954] ICJ Ra'. 24, the Court rendered its decision
in a way which, in effect, protected the interests of Albania, which was at that time
not a member of the United Nations. The Monetary Gold case arose out of the failure
of Albania to pay compensation due to the United Kingdom under the decision of the
Court in the Corfu Channel case, [1948] ICJ REP. 15; [1949] ICJ REP. 4; [1954] lQJ
BEn'. 19. The Court had initially based its jurisdiction in the Corfu Channel case on
the doctrine of forum prorogatum but in the subsequent proceedings jurisdiction was
based on the special agreement concluded by the United Kingdom and Albania.
[Vol. 68
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hospitals which draw on resources insufficient for the problems and case
loads each is assigned to process. Overloaded institutions develop opera-
tional codes 25 for allocating scarce resources; actors within such institutions
know almost intuitively how much to give to each case, and decisions are
constantly made implementing and revising the code. Because time has
not been an urgent institutional concern, the Court does not appear to have
evolved a refined time code; 26 the Court can afford to be more generous
with its resources, to tailor the sequence of time to each case, but not to
be prodigal. If there are not many other cases, there are other cases; and
while one of the litigants may anticipate a gain in delay, particularly for
negotiating purposes, a significant time lag may involve real deprivations
for its opponent. And there may be debits of impaired perception and
understanding involved in long delays and frequent interruptions as op-
posed to a fairly smooth and consecutive set of judicial sequences.27 It is
thus no surprise that Article 41 of the Rules of Court states that ". . . time
limits shall be as short as the character of the case permits." In regard to
advisory opinions, Article 87(2) of the Rules provides that if "the Court
finds that an early answer would be desirable, the Court shall take all
necessary steps to accelerate the procedure."
But accelerated procedure, like its lethargic counterpart, also has its costs.
Too stringent a control of the time element may impose hardships on one
or more of the litigants and may in certain circumstances amount to the
deprivation of a procedural right. Many procedural rights can be imple-
mented only with sufficient time. Thus audi alterem partem is meaningful
only if there is adequate time to prepare written and oral pleadings and
to engage in the many other preadjudicative steps which must be performed
if the promised day in court is to be exploited. Similarly the right to
counsel is meaningful only if there is sufficient time to consult with counsel.
Intergovernmental and crosscultural litigation may involve consumptions of
time not comparable to those of municipal litigation. A case may involve
major policy considerations requiring consultation of different departments
and agencies in a government; such activities can extend the time necessary
for the preparation of pleadings. Translation may require time. In the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, Norway observed:
Le Gouvernement norvdgien doit reiger son Contre-M6moire en une
langue Itrang~re et doit 4galement faire traduire toute la documenta-
2 5 On operational code, see N. LErr7s, THE OPEBA ToNAL CODE: OF Pormuno
(1951) and ldem. A STmDy OF BOLsEvism (1953). In Reisman & Simson, Com-
pacts: A Study of Interstate Agreements in the American Federal System 27 RuTGERs
L. R. 70 (1973), operational code is used to designate the demands and related expec-
tations actually held by politically relevant strata in an institutional setting. In a hos-
pital setting, for example, where general social morality barred overt discussion of allo-
cation of scarce resources for patients determining who will live, for how long, and
who will die, the "operational code" would refer to the unwritten and unstated norms
about making these decisions.
2 6 But Cf. Order, Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, [1951] ICJ REP. 9.
27 Indeed, the Court itself indicated some awareness of this feature in an Order on a
time decision in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case [1951] ICJ EPe. 9.
1974]
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tion y jointe: il est oblig6, enfin, de faire imprimer Contre-M6moire et
annexes hors de son pays.2
Linguistic parochialism does not correlate with the smallness of a state, but
it seems certain that many smaller states lack the resources to secure quick
and accurate translations of documents vital to the preparation of a case.
In these and similar cases, time may be so fundamental to the exploita-
tion of a procedural right that, where a time deprivation effectively evis-
cerates it, there might be a ground for nullification.29
Certain claims to participate, which were formerly considered procedural
rights, are now deemed, in municipal systems, to be primarily for the ben-
efit of the tribunal. Thus, the extent of the right to be heard in adminis-
trative settings is often determined by the needs of the administrative organ
for information regarding the pending decision1s  The policies that might
support this view municipally have scant application in international ad-
judication where the extent of the privilege to present one's own case may
be an important component in securing compliance with an adverse deci-
sion as well as in prospective consent to adjudicate. For an institution
whose jurisdiction is consensual, too stringent a hand in shaping the time
dimension of a case can drive off potential litigants.
II
THE AcLRATON OF THE NA~imIA CASE
The Namibia case 31 presents in sharp relief many of the problems in-
volved in the judicial design of the temporal sequences of a case. The
requesting resolution of the Security Council, adopted on July 29, 1970,82
asked that the advisory opinion '% . . be transmitted to the Security Coun-
cil at an early date." The core text of the request was wired that day, and
certified copies were sent by the Secretary-General to the Court, apparently
through regular mails. They had not yet reached the Registry of the Court
by August 5, 1970.38 On that day, the texts of the resolution in English
and French were wired to the Court's Registry. 4 On the same day, the
President of the Court issued an Order, fixing September 23, 1970 as the
28 Anglo-Norwegjan Fisheries, 4 Pleadings 637, cited in 2 RosENN, supra note 16,
at 561.
29See Domke, Israeli-Soviet Oil Arbitration, 53 AJIL 787 (1959). The statutes of
international arbitral tribunals do not provide for nullifications of their own awards; the
Statute of the ICJ is no exception to this practice. Regarding the possibility of nulli-
fication of an ICJ judgment see Rmss", supra note 6, at 123-24; Reisman, Revision
of the South West Africa Cases: An Analysis of the Grounds of Nullity in the Decision
of July 18, 1966 and Methods of Revision, 7 VA. J. IN'rL L. 1, 12-15 (1966).30See, for example, I DAvis, AnvmzrmsTAraivE LAw TREATsE 382, 412 ff. (1958).
Cf. the comment of the Registrar of the IJ in a cable to Professor Elias, Implying that
the O.A.U.'s right to submit a written statement in the Namibia case depended on the
Court's independent conclusion that the O.A.U. could furnish information on the ques-
tion. 2 Pleadings, Namibia 646 and see infra text and notes at note 49.
3' 11971] ICJ EP,. 16. 82 Sec. Council Res. 284 (1970).
832 Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents, Namibia Case 629.
s4 Ibid.
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time limit for written statements to be filed by members of the United
Nations.35 On the same day, the Registrar sent the "special and direct"
communication, required by Article 66 of the Statute, to "any state entitled
to appear before the Court or international organization considered by the
Court... as likely to be able to furnish information on the question... " 3
The Order thus allowed fifty days, from day of issuance to day of closure,
within which time states and specific international organizations might
exercise their privilege to prepare and submit written statements. Only on
August 21, 1970, did the President of the Court decide that nonmember
states entitled to appear before the Court should also be sent the "special
and direct" communication. 37 Hence these states were initially allowed
only 34 days from issuance of the invitation to closure to prepare and
submit written statements.
In comparative quantitative terms, as the appended table shows,;8 a
fifty-day period in an accelerated case was not a noticeably shorter time
limit for the submission of written statements than that allowed in an ordi-
nary nonaccelerated case. However, it was, at least initially, significantly
shorter than the time allowed in the two other opinions dealing with South
West Africa. Comparison cannot be drawn with the contentious South
West Africa cases of 1966,31 for time limits there were regulated predom-
inantly by the litigants themselves.
On August 19, 1970, the South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs for-
mally requested an extension until January 31, 1971 of the time limit set
by the President.'0 The South African Government invoked "Rule of Court
37.4 read with Rule of Court 82.1." [Rule 37(4) is now Rule 40(4); Rule
82(1) is now Rule 87(1).] South Africa contended that it was the state
most intimately concerned in the matter and that justice required that it
be given a fair opportunity to present its views. It knew most about South
West Africa and hence the Court would gain if South Africa were given
sufficient time to adduce all the evidence it deemed relevant. A number
of important issues were raised in the request, South Africa contended, and
they could not be presented before January, 1971. South Africa conceaed
that the Security Council had asked for an early opinion but argued that
"Rule of Court 82.2 should always be accompanied by a full regard for the
requirements of justice." "
The President of the Court acceded to South Africa's request only in part.
He extended the time limit to November 19, 1970 or an additional 57 days.' 2
His Order was not accompanied by reasons. One would presume that this
omission stemmed from the President's view that he was acting on the basis
of a discretionary competence. It is clear from the Court's response to
later procedural claims that it was unwilling to characterize South Africa
as in any way an adversary, entitled pro tanto to the privileges available
3 [1971] ICJ REP. 16, 17. 36 Pleadings, op. cit. at 631.
3 Id. at 634.38The tables are appended at the conclusion of this article.
.3 [1966] ICJ RP. 8. 40 Pleadings, op. cit. at 633.
41 Id. at 633-34. 42 [1970] ICJ REp. 362.
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to litigants in contentious procedure. 3  Nevertheless, it is with this partic-
ular order that some of the problems of accelerated procedure began to
surface.
The time limit was proving a problem not only for South Africa. On
November 13, 1970, the Permanent Representatives to the United Nations
of Burundi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, the United Arab Republic, and Zambia,
wrote from New York to the Registrar that, in concert with certain other
African states, they were preparing a joint written statement:
Our Governments very much regret, as do the other African Govern-
ments concerned, that it has not proved possible to complete this joint
statement, relating to a most important subject on which a vast quan-
tity of documentation exists, within the time limit of 19 November 1970
for the filing of written statements . . .Our Governments are fully
aware of the concern of the Court that it be permitted to proceed in
any contentious case or advisory opinion with the utmost expedition,
but our Governments wish to stress their very strong hope and desire
that an extension may be granted to permit the African States con-
cerned to file their joint written statement.
Our Governments trust that you fully appreciate the element of time
involved in the preparation of a joint statement by a number of African
Governments, owing to the process of consultations required in such
a situation."
On the same day, Professor T. 0. Elias, Attorney General and Commis-
sioner for Justice of Nigeria, wrote from Lagos to the Registrar, on his own
and on behalf of Dr. Abdullah EI-Erian of the U.A.R. Mission to the United
Nations. Concerned that the request for an extension of the time limit
would not be granted, he submitted what he described as a "hurried Memo-
randum on the subject." This was to be submitted on behalf of the Orga-
nization of African Unity, and a proof of authorization would follow in
due course.' 5
It was not until November 18 that the Registrar received a cable of the
joint African request for an extension. 46  The letter itself arrived only "late
in the afternoon of 19 November 1970." 47 In a cable to Professor Elias on
November 18, the Registrar stated:
President however is not disposed to grant any extension but intends
to inform all recipients of special and direct communication that Court
will be prepared to hear oral statements from them in the course of
hearings . ..4
Furthermore, cabled the Registrar, "Organization of African Unity was not
considered by President as likely to be able to furnish information on ques-
tion." 49 The OAU could still appeal the President's ruling to the plenary
court, but only late in January. The Registrar stated, however, that the
Elias Memorandum would be accepted if it were promptly certified as
submitted for any one or any number of the five states on whose behalf
4 8 Id. at 21-27. 44 Pleadings, op. ct. at 642.
4a Id. at 642-43. 461d. at 645-46.
47 Id. at 647. 48 Id. at 645.
'9 Id. at 646.
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the request had originally been lodged.50 On November 20, the Perma-
nent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations wired the Court that
the Elias Memorandum was sponsored by the Federal Republic of Nigeria
and it was so accepted by the Registrar.51  On November 24, 1970, the
Registrar wrote the group of African states conveying in more extended
form the gist of his telegram to Professor Elias.52 On the same date, the
Registrar wrote to the Yugoslav Foreign Office accepting its Memorandum.
The Registrar observed that
l.. e Pr6sident de la Cour a decid6 de l'accepter bien qu'elle soit
parvenue apres la date d'expiration du delai pour le dep6t des expos6s
6crits . . ."3
Twelve states, only two of which were permanent members of the Secur-
ity Council, submitted written statements; "' eight states, only one of which
had not submitted a written statement, appeared in the oral proceedings."5
The United Nations Secretariat submitted a written statement and appeared
for oral argument.56 The Organization of African Unity appeared in oral
argument.57 In short, 13 states including two permanent members of the
Security Council, the Secretariat, and one regional organization participated
in a major international constitutional case before the International Court
of Justice. If comparison takes into account the growing number of states
competent to appear before the Court in an advisory case,5 then participa-
tion in this case shows a significant decline.
After closure for submission of written statements, the tempo of the case
was less than frenetic. Oral statements were heard from February 8 to
March 17, 1971. The advisory opinion was delivered on June 21, 1971,
97 days after closure of all proceedings. This 97-day period seems to have
been almost twice as long as the average interim between closure and
opinion in unaccelerated advisory cases.59
While participation in other major constitutional cases has been far from
plenary, it has somewhat exceeded participation in this case, if the denom-
inator of participation is the number of member states competent to appear
before the Court.60 Causal links between the time limits set by the Court
and the decision by different foreign offices to begin to prepare written
5o Ibid. 51 Ibid.
52 Id. at 647-48. In Id. at 648-49.
5 The states submitting written statements or letters were Czechoslovakia, Finland,
France, Hungary, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, the
United States, and Yugoslavia.
55 Finland, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic sub nom. the Organization of
African Unity, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Republic of Vietnam,
and the United States.
5 1 Pleadings 75--206; C. H. Stavropoulos and D. B. H. Vickers pleaded orally for
the Secretary-General.
7 2 Pleadings 88.
8 If we take as a base the Reservations case of 1951 which also dealt with a world
constitutive issue and in which there was the same number of participants as in the
Namibia case, rough participatory comparisons are as follows: In 1951, 13 out of 60;
in 1971, 13 out of 130. In short participation was about halved.
59 See Annex, infra pp. 670-71. go See supra note 58.
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statements are, perforce, speculative. With that caveat, I am assuming
that the Court's decision as to time did deter certain states, at least as many
as four African states, from preparing statements and, in general, acted to
"chill" if not to still procedural privileges. The Court seemed to assume
that the availability of oral argument would compensate for the inability
to submit a timely written statement. 1
Because the Statute and the Rules permit the Court to accelerate the
advisory procedure when it is necessary, the mere fact that acceleration
took place and that procedural privileges were proportionately reduced
cannot be characterized per se as a procedural pathology. The critical
question for the evaluator of lawfulness, as well as for the actual decision-
maker, is whether the chosen degree of acceleration and the corresponding
diminution of procedural privileges were justified in the circumstances of
the case.
III
CmER A FOR ACCELRATION
When a requesting organ indicates urgency, the decision to accelerate is
exclusively a matter for the Court's competence. If the Court is not ob-
liged to respond to a request for an advisory opinion, a matter which has
been well established since the Eastern Carelia case, 2 it is certainly not
obliged to accept the characterization of urgency as set by the requesting
agency.63
What then are the procedures and the criteria which the Court in partic-
ular, and institutions faced with the time problem in general, ought to
apply in determining whether to accelerate and the degree of acceleration?
I suggest the following guidelines:
(1). Determine, by contextual investigation, the existence of a crisis and
its magnitude, particularly with regard to the aggregate social and political
consequences likely to ensue should judgment or opinion be rendered in
the normal tempo.
(2). Determine the extent to which rapid decision will contribute to
abating the crisis.
(3). Balance the gains in abatement of the crisis by acceleration of the
process against the costs in diminution of participation which may be a
consequence of acceleration.
(4). Gauge the extent to which the case at bar is one of major world
constitutional concern. Seek to increase participation in such decisions in
proportion to the constitutional magnitude of the case.
(5). Where rapid decision is necessary, seek innovative ways of freezing
events or restraining that behavior the projected consummation of which
612 Pleadings 648. 62 [1923] PCIJ ser. B, No. 5.
6B As Judge Jim6nez de Ar6chaga has observed (supra note 8, at 9):
Naturally the requesting organ only expresses its view and its desire as to the
urgency of the answer: it remains for the Court to comply with this request if it
is feasible to do so, taking into account all of its duties and functions.
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has elicited a demand for acceleration, rather than obliging judges and
litigants to accelerate their own activities and deliberations.
Let us consider each of these recommendations in more detail.
The Existence and Magnitude of the Crisis
Individuals or groups actually concerned with a cluster of events may
exaggerate the importance and the critical nature of those events as a tech-
nique of advocacy or because they have, in good faith, lost perspective.
Countless plaintiffs enter court insisting that great and irreparable public
and private harm will occur if the court does not immediately grant them
the remedy they have requested. And countless courts, drawing on their
own well of experience, reject the demand for rapid, comparatively uncon-
sidered decision and move with that deliberate speed which they inde-
pendently conclude the case at bar warrants. Merely establishing the
existence of a crisis is not decisive, for even where events have reached a
critical level, rapid decision may not dissipate it. Indeed, in some contexts,
an extended period in court may cool things off. The point of emphasis
here is that a court, like the citizen importuned by a dazzling salesman to
buy something before "it's too late," must determine independently how
important speed is and itself act as the architect of the temporal structure
of the case.
The Utility of Accelerated Decision
One of the characteristics of crisis is the high stress to action which it
engenders in individuals who see themselves as threatened. This charac-
teristic is potentially dangerous because action itself may neither abate
crisis nor cause it to develop in ways congenial to the actor, but may, in
fact, exacerbate it. Hence a collegium of judges, like any other group,
must ask itself whether the action toward which stress presses it is con-
textually irrational or will actually contribute to treating the crisis in ways
consonant with community goals. To be sure, there are circumstances in
which rapid decision can exploit crisis in ways conducive to improved
public order, as certain cases of discrimination in the United States have
demonstrated." Slow, deliberate decision, in contrast, may increase the
opportunities to organize resistance to authorized social change. Yet there
are many situations in which rapid decision will be a factor of minimum
and sometimes negative significance in changing or freezing a situation.
The Costs of Acceleration
Temporal procedures, as I have said, are designed and refined by prac-
tice to maximize the efficiency of decisions and the skill of litigants and
court in standardized contexts. Insofar as the procedures actually achieve
6 C. Saenger and E. Gilbert, Customer Reactions to the Integration of Negro Sales
Personnel, 4 INTL J. OPMION AND ATrrrDE SEARCH 57 (1950) and see especially
at 69-70. One lesson of these investigations is that in some contexts rapid social change
may prove less socially disruptive than slow deliberate change.
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their objectives, variations from them will always have costs, either to the
parties or to the court. In a bilateral dispute in which both parties concur
in demands for acceleration, the major cost will be borne by the Court, in
attenuated opportunities for receipt and processing of information and for
deliberation. In bilateral disputes in which one party urges acceleration,
the cost will be borne by the other party and by the Court. In cases which
are in the character of an actio popularis and invite wide participation or
have potentially wide impacts on the community *-iand these may reach
the Court under contentious or advisory jurisdiction-the costs of accel-
erated procedures will be borne by the Court and all those whose proce-
dural privileges have been comparatively diminished.
It is thus important for a Court petitioned to accelerate its procedures,
or contemplating such action, to consider all the costs as against all the
benefits which accrue. As the costs increase for the Court and the com-
munity, the degree of acceleration which the Court is willing to order
should diminish proportionately.
The Special Problem of Constitutional Cases
Courts make law. All members of the United Nations and all public
international organizations are concerned with pending judgments and
opinions likely to change or to confirm fundamental aspects of the world
constitutive process. 66 The Statute of the Court emphasizes the special
status of such cases by providing rather broad participatory privileges in
advisory jurisdiction and more limited opportunities for intervention in the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court. 7 Decisions to accelerate cases of
inclusive interests, particularly those of a constitutional character, will have
a deprivatory effect on both the Court and many members of the interna-
tional community. The Court sacrifices more extended opportunities for
deliberation; community members lose participatory privileges. Hence, in
constitutional cases, judicial resistance to accelerating procedures should
increase in proportion to the scope of impact of the projected decision.
The Need for Creative Alternatives
The costs of acceleration, even when deemed necessary, should move
courts to seek alternative and more economic methods of achieving the
objectives of acceleration. Speed is of no inherent value. In context, its
utility turns on the fact that it may minimize current behavior causing a
consumption of values which the Court is likely to characterize as retro-
65 See generally Schwelb, The Actlo Popularis and International Law, IsRa m. YB.
HM MAN PiHrs 46 (1972).68 McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authorita-
tive Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 403; reprinted in 1 BLACm AN FALx, TuE FUTURE
OF THE INTEBNATIONAL LEGAL OrER 73 (1969).67 See Statute Arts. 66 and 62. See also Jos6 Puente Egido, Consideraclones sabre
la Naturaleza y Efectos de las Opinlones Consultivas 31 ZA6RV 730, 807 (1971) where
it is argued that principles of natural justice require broadening lus standi in advisory
opinions so that all interested states can participate directly in the proceedings.
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actively unlawful. There are many cases in which this utility can be
acquired without acceleration of procedures. The device of interim mea-
sures, for example,68 may minimize the current consumption of values not
by accelerating court procedures, but by decelerating that flow of social
events the lawfulness of which the Court is considering. Interim measures
would appear to recommend themselves in advisory cases, particularly
when many states are concerned with the projected outcome of the case.
No authority for interim measures in advisory opinions is given in the
Statute. The invention of a functional equivalent is a challenge to judicial
ingenuity. One method might be a communication back to the requesting
organ, suggesting that it use its own competence to "freeze" events rather
than require the Court to accelerate the procedures of the case.69
I am, in this respect, critical of the International Court's revision of its
rules.7' The revisors, apparently much concerned with the need for accel-
eration of advisory procedures,71 felt that the current possibilities for accel-
eration were inadequate. Hence they have amended Article 87(2) of the
Rules to permit the Court to dispense entirely with written evidence and
to proceed directly to hearing and deliberation.
When the body authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations to request an advisory opinion informs the Court that
its request necessitates an urgent answer, or the Court finds that an
early answer would be desirable, the Court shall take all necessary
steps to accelerate the procedure. If the Court is not sitting when
such a request is made, it shall be convened for the purpose of pro-
ceeding to a hearing and deliberation on the request.
Judge Jim6nez de Arechaga 72 explains that authority for this type of accel-
eration is to be found in the language of Article 66 of the Statute 73 and in
68 Statute Art. 41. See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, [1951] ICJ tPr. 89; Iceland
Fisheries case [1972] ICJ REP. 35.
69 The need for an international injunction process goes far beyond the narrow range
of activities of the International Court. Given the capacity of contemporary technology
to introduce rapid, vast and perhaps irreparable changes in the environment, the need
for an international restraining competence is greater than ever.
70 For the reasons motivating the Court to depart from its original purpose of sys-
tematic revision of the Rules to a partial amendment, see Nuclear Tests Case (Australia
v. France), Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection [1973] ICJ
REP. 99; Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, supra note 8, at 1.
71 Id. at 9-11. 72 Id. at 9-10.
73Statute Article 66 (4) refers to states which have "presented written or oral state-
ments or both." From this language Judge Jim6nez de Ar6chaga seems to learn that
the Court is authorized to prevent all parties from one of the alternative forms of par-
ticipation. I would concede that as a general matter of teleological interpretation, the
Court may, where appropriate, restrict forms of participation if this does not discrim-
inate in favor of one litigant and contributes to the performance of the major functions
of the tribunal. This was the case in the Administrative Tribunals opinion: [1956]
ICJ REP. 77. On the other hand, Article 66(4) plainly refers to an option of the states
and agencies appearing in the advisory process and not to an option of the Court. The
distinction can be important; it distinguishes the Administrative Tribunals case from the
regrettable attenuation of participation which the Court has undertaken in its revision
of the Rules. On individuals in advisory proceedings, see Gross, Participation of In-
dividuals in Advisory Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice: Questio of
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the LL.O. Administrative Tribunal case.7 4 The language of the Statute is
indeed sufficiently general and the I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal case did,
in fact, dispense with oral proceedings. The thrust of that decision, how-
ever, was not to diminish participation, but to increase it by giving a non-
state litigant effective equality before the Court. Without this device, the
Court might have felt constrained to refuse cases of this sort altogether.
And though the LL.O. case had constitutional implications, it was basically
an appeal from an international administrative tribunal. There is thus
some casuistry in invoking it as a justification for acceleration and con-
comitant diminution of effective participation. In the same vein, Article
66 of the Statute may be read as a policy instrument for increasing not
decreasing participation.
While one can applaud the change in Rule 87(2) for increasing the
overall flexibility of the Court and recognize that there will be cases in
which time is so decisive that written statements should be dispensed with,
one can only regret that this was the sole institutional response which the
court could provide to the problem of speed in advisory decisions.
IV
THE NazmmnAN ACCELERMArON
Resolution 2145(XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on October 27,
1966 decided that:
the Mandate conferred upon His Britanic Majesty to be exer-
cised on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa
is therefore terminated, that South Africa has no other right to ad-
minister the Territory and that henceforth South West Africa comes
under the direct responsibility of the United Nations.75
South Africa did not comply with this resolution, claiming it was ultra vires
and without legal effect. The Government of South Africa continued to
exercise plenary power in the mandated territory and to bar the committee
appointed by the General Assembly from entering and undertaking to
exercise any authority there.76
On January 30, 1970, the Security Council adopted Resolution 276(1970)
which recognized the Assembly's termination of the Mandate, considered
South Africa's continued presence in Namibia illegal, and concluded by
calling upon ".... the Government of South Africa to immediately with-
draw its administration from the territory."77 On July 29, 1970, the Secur-
ity Council, recalling Resolution 276, asked the Court for an advisory
Equality Between the Parties, 52 AJIL 16 (1958). And on the real costs of dispensing
with oral argument see the dissent of Judge Gros in Application for Review of Judg-
ment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal [1973] ICJ REP. 265-66.
74 [1956] ICJ Ra. 77, 85-87.
75GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 (A/6316), at 2.
76 Report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa, GAOR 22nd Sess.,
Annexes, Agenda item 64 at 2. Report of the United Nations Council for Namibia,
GAOR 23rd Sess., Agenda item 64, A/7338.
77Sec. Council Res. 276 (1970), Jan. 30, 1970.
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opinion, "at an early date," on the question:
What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence
of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolu-
tion 276(1970) 71
The nominal question posed was the legal consequences for third states of
South Africa's continued presence in Namibia. But in responding to this
question, the Court could well anticipate that it might (as it indeed did)
deal with such fundamental world constitutional questions as its own com-
petence to review the validity of resolutions by the General Assembly and
the Security Council, the scope of the prescriptive competence of the
General Assembly, and the general competence of United Nations organs
to intervene in, modify, and terminate international agreements. Any
decision on these matters would have a continuing impact on all members
of the global community and the entire institutional structure of decision
in international law.
Such questions, one would have thought would be treated in a tempo
of deliberation which would allow as many as possible of the states entitled
to participate in the process to have their day in court. Acceleration of
proceedings 79 here would thus be extremely serious and undertaken only
for reasons of real urgency. Since the Security Council had only indicated
that it wanted an opinion "at an early date" without further specification
and since, in any event, the Court must determine the extent of urgency,
the President of the Court was presented with a heavy choice.
Unfortunately, neither the majority nor the concurring and dissenting
opinions explain why a decision to accelerate was made. The reason was
not that the Security Council had suspended all activities and was waiting
breathlessly for the Court's opinion. Nor was the reason that the Court's
opinion might in any way have alleviated the deprivations of human rights
which were then inflicted and continue to be inflicted upon the peoples of
Namibia. 0 The thrust of Security Council Resolution 276 had been to
mobilize support among other UN members to act in concert to deny, by
word and deed, any recognition of South Africa's effective control over
Namibia. The purpose of Security Council Resolution 284 was to deter-
mine the 'legal consequences" for third states of South Africa's continued
presence in Namibia. No one in the General Assembly, the Security Coun-
78 Sec. Council Res. 284 (1970), July 29, 1970.
r The Permanent Court dispensed with oral argument in the interim measures phase
of the Belgian-Chinese case, PCIJ ser. A, No. 8, at 6-8 (1927) perhaps because China
appointed no agent and at no time made an appearance. It also dispensed with them
in the Prince von Pless case, ser. A/B, No. 54, at 150, 152 after waiver of "the right to
a hearing" by each side. On the advisory side, there were no oral arguments in the
Polish Postal Service case, PCIJ ser. B, No. 11, at 10. In the Jurisdiction of Danzig
Courts case, PCIJ ser. B, No. 15, at 7, the Permanent Court insisted on argument
despite the disinterest of the "interested states." In the interim measures phase of
Chorzow Factory case, ser. A, No. 12, at 9 (1927), the Court dispensed with observa-
tions by Poland, in effect the respondent, because it rejected virtually in limine litis,
Germany's request.
80 For a survey of the literature in this regard, see S. Gross, The United Nations,
Self-Determination and the Namibia Question, 82 YALE L.J. 533 (1973).
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cil, or the Court believed for a moment that any decision in this advisory
procedure would lead to an abrupt change of South African policy, much
less a sudden withdrawal from Namibia. Given these conditions, accel-
eration involved costs but no gains.
The reasons for the Security Council's request for acceleration and the
intensity of the demand for urgency are unavailable. Speaking specula-
tively, as one must, it seems that the Court acceded to the request to
accelerate the procedure because it was conscious of criticism that its
proceedings (notably in the Barcelona Traction Co. case) had been too
lengthy and slow moving and because changes in the composition of the
Court had brought to the fore a coalition which believed that the 1966
contentious decision was incorrect and had harmed the image of the inter-
national judiciary.81 The 1970 request was a chance to correct that image
and to regain credentials of justice among a majority of the states of the
world. And indeed, the Court may have succeeded in this objective.
Parts of the substantive portion of its opinion of June 21, 1971 may prove
to be a most important contribution to world order. But a judicial urge
to regain respect can hardly justify an accelerated procedure diminishing
the privileges of participation.
There is, of course, a constant pressure internationally and nationally to
bend procedural forms to the larger issue on which the action is brought.
After all, it would seem, procedure is an instrument for the substantive
issue and not vice versa. In Robinson v. Smyth,"? an old case which bears
some eerie resemblances to the Namibia case, the plaintiff, a seaman, sued
for wages for a voyage from the West Indies to London. The defense was
that the plaintiff was a slave for whom the defendant had paid valuable
consideration. But this could only be established by an absent witness.
Accordingly, the defendant moved to put off the trial until the witness was
available. The Court of Common Pleas rejected the motion, on the ground
that the entire defense was "odious" and should be given no assistance
by the court.
In Robinson v. Smyth, the Court of Common Pleas was using procedure
as a way of terminating an undesirable institution. But the Court itself
would not have dismissed the importance of procedure, for procedures
themselves are expressions of important community policies. If a court is
concerned with its image of due process, the Robinson v. Smyth technique
can only be used if, first, there has been some prior public deliberation
about the justice of the institution in question. If there has not been such
deliberation, one party is really being deprived of a chance to present its
position and its conception of the common interest and to have it deliber-
ated. Second, there must be effective political power at the disposal of
the court in question to back up its pronouncement or, at least, to have
83 Of the six regular members of the Court voting for the 1966 judgment, only Judges
Fitzmaurice and Gros remained for the 1971 Opinion. For a critique of the judgment
and an argument for its nullification on grounds of improper composition, see Reisman,
Revision of the South West Africa Cases, supra note 29, at 3.
821 Bos. & Pul. 455 (1799); 126 E.R. 1007.
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it accepted as authoritative. Any legislator without effective power will
not make law for others, but will make a fool of himself. Third, the tech-
nique can only be used, in a manifest way, sparingly; if it is used more,
the promise of due process, which is a distinctive attraction of judicial
institutions, will be squandered.
V
ALTENrATES FOR THE Ftrruim
Where time is of the essence, a number of institutional devices may be
adapted or invented in order to achieve the benefits of acceleration with
a minimum of the costs we have assessed. Let us consider these alterna-
tives, starting with the least ambitious.
1. Where there is an accelerated procedure, the Registrar should not
leave The Hague for extended periods of time, for his advice to partic-
ipants and to the President of the Court can alleviate many of the hard-
ships of accelerated procedure. In the Namibia case, the critical temporal
period extended from the first week of August to November 19, 1970. The
Registrar was engaged in what he characterized as a "somewhat prolonged
visit" at UN headquarters from the second week of September until early
November 1970.83
2. In accelerated procedures, the Court should designate the Secre-
tary-General as an authorized alternative receipt agent for certified docu-
ments, or have someone in the Secretariat designated as a second deputy
Registrar (in addition to the one in The Hague). The Secretary-General
would transmit the documents by courier upon receipt and the Registry of
the Court would deem them received the moment they were deposited
with the Secretary-General. The effectiveness of this suggestion will de-
pend, of course, on the international civil servant in question performing
his function with dispatch. In the Namibia case, mail between New York
and The Hague seemed regularly to take five days! Where a particular
region is concerned in an advisory case, an official of a regional organiza-
tion might be designated as receipt agent for that case.
3. If time is of the essence and the Court decides to accelerate litiga-
tion, it should make a comparable effort to accelerate its own internal pro-
cedures. With the exception of the I.L.O. case,84 in many ways a special
species of international administrative appeal handled throughout at a
most leisurely pace, the ICJ in the Namibia case took almost twice as much
time from closure of all proceedings to the delivery of the opinion as it had
taken, on the average, in other advisory opinions. The simplest device
for acceleration involves a per curiam decision of the dispositif which is
made public as soon as possible. It is then followed by a separate presen-
S3 Letter from Registrar, Nov. 6, 1970, 2 Pleadings 638.
84 Judgment of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labor Organization
upon Complaints Made Against the UNESCO, [19561 ICJ REP. 77.
1974]
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tation of the entire opinion, including the concurring and dissenting opin-
ions, at a later date. 5
4. An accelerated procedure should not attempt to dispense with
written statements in favor of oral argument alone, although it should limit
their length. The tendency of the Court in the Namibia case and in its
revision of some of its Rules 88 has been to sacrifice written statements
when an accelerated procedure is deemed necessary. To be sure the ex-
press language of Article 66 of the Statute of the Court is disjunctive and
not mandatorily cumulative; the reference there is to written or oral state-
ments "or both." Judge Guerrero, moreover, did argue, as Judge Jim6nez
de Ar~chaga notes, in the course of the drafting of the Rules of Court of
the Permanent Court of International Justice that the Court "was not
bound to arrange both for written and oral proceedings." 7  And indeed
where urgency of decision is paramount, it may be necessary to dispense
with the written statements. But this should be a last resort for a number
of reasons. First, written statements permit a considered presentation of
issues. Second, and extremely important, written statements permit orga-
nizations and perhaps ultimately nongovernmental organizations to partic-
ipate in advisory proceedings in which they can contribute data relevant
to the decision at bar.88 Third, submission and processing of a written
statement actually takes less court time than does oral argument, for read-
ing a text is faster than listening to it in its interpreted duplicate in the
laborious pleading pattern of the International Court of Justice. Where
time is of the essence, written statements should be limited but not
dropped completely. The Court may indicate that it does not wish state-
ments of more than, let us say, thirty pages 89 or indicate the points on
which it wishes to hear argument.
85 This would have been quite feasible in the Namibia case itself. The great bulk
of the majority opinion there deals with preliminary questions, subjected to exhaustive
legal analysis. It is only in paragraph 117 (page 42 of a 46 page opinion) that the
majority states: '"Having reached these conclusions, the Court will now address itself
to the legal consequences arising for States from the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia. . . " Thereafter, the dispositif is presented in one and a half pages.86 See text and notes supra at 18-19.
87Jimnnez de Ar6chaga, supra note 8, at 10. If the context of Judge Guerrero's
comment is taken into account, its import is changed. The discussion revolved about
a proposal submitted by Judge Negulesco to permit oral argument in advisory opinions
which were about "questions" and not about "disputes." The proposal was withdrawn
and the consensus seems to have been that the rule change would have been ultra vires
Statute Article 66, PCIJ, ser. D. Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of
the Court; Third Addendum to No. 2. Elaboration of the Rules of Court of March
11th, 1936.
88 Statute Art. 66, paras. 2 and 4. Cf. Art. 34 (3).
89 In a companion article to this study, [Amici Curiae Jure Gentium: For a Court in
Need of Friends (in preparation)], I argue that the major motive for the Court's
attenuation of the privilege of submission of written statements may have been to limit
the amount of data which it would have to process in cases and, more generally, to
limit "excessive" participation in the case. It is ironic that Judge Jim6nez de Ar6chaga
in his defense of the revised Rules of Court cited the I.L.O. case as a precedent for
dropping written pleadings. In the I.L.O. case, oral argument was dropped to increase
participation on equal terms. The Court accepted the written statements of both the
[Vol. 68
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5. Some minor changes in the Statute and the Rules might be con-
sidered to enable the Court to exploit its existing institutional arrangements
more effectively. In accelerated procedures, the President of the Court
should immediately convoke the chamber of summary procedure 9 0 as soon
as he has provisionally characterized the case as one of an urgent nature.
Precisely because accelerated procedure does involve judicial costs and
diminution of the procedural privileges of some and in some cases of all
litigants concerned, it should have collegiate judicial consideration before
it is so characterized. While events may dictate a rather rapid in camera
decision, it is conceivable that short notice might be given to interested
parties to appear for oral argument and to show cause why the accelerated
procedure should not be resorted to. If the chamber of summary proce-
dure concludes that the requested opinion warrants acceleration, the cham-
ber should remain in continuous session until the plenary court is convened
or oral argument commences. Rulings by the President that deny the
procedural privileges of one or more litigants would be appealed to the
chamber which would rule after hearing oral argument.
6. Some functional equivalent to the injunction or "indication of in-
terim measures" should be developed for advisory opinions. When the
Court is asked to speed up, it should have the competence to turn and ask
others to slow down. Ingenuity will be required to implement this device.
I would propose the following procedures: the chamber of summary
procedure, upon determining that the urgency of the case at bar warrants
commencing an accelerated procedure, would proceed to draft an advisory
opinion on interim measures, the purpose of which would be to prevent
acts and events that might frustrate or impede the advisory deliberations.
This interim opinion would be delivered to the organization requesting the
advisory opinion with the request that the petitioning organ give the
interim opinion its earliest attention. Depending upon the urgency of the
situation, the organ could then either require or recommend to its own
members that they comply with the interim request of the Court. Because
the Court would be considering the merits of the case immediately there-
after and because the good faith of some states might be of some relevance
to the Court's deliberations and formulation of an opinion, the interim
opinion could actually have more potential as a sanction than the final
opinion itself.
I.L.O. and a private party and dispensed with oral argument for it assumed that only
the I.L.O. would have been permitted to appear in that phase. The Court might also
have permitted the employees and the I.L.O. to argue orally as two representatives of
the I.L.O. appearing on behalf of that organization. I believe that attenuation of
participation is unwvise as a political strategy and ill-considered as a technique for in-
creasing the rationality of judicial decision. Currently the device of the written state-
ment is the most economic way of increasing participation in advisory and ultimately
perhaps in contentious jurisdiction.
90 See note and text supra at note 9. Significantly, the revised rules do attempt to
expand the role of Chambers. See Jessup, To Form a More Perfect United Nations,
129 REcut-m zEs Couns 21 (1970); Hyde, A Special Chamber of the International
Court of justice, 62 AJIL 439 (1968); Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, supra note 8, at 2-4.
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